Anzus Agreement 1951
In the 2010s, New Zealand and the United States forged close relations, although it is not clear that the renewed partnership is under the auspices of the 1951 Trilateral Treaty. The 2010 Wellington Declaration defined a “strategic partnership” between New Zealand and the United States, and New Zealand joined the Rim of the Pacific military exercise off Hawaii for the first time since 1984 for the first time since 1984. The U.S. ban on New Zealand-based vessels was lifted after the 2012 fiscal year.  Given the obvious criticism of the ADF operations of most of the platforms or weapons listed above, it is clear that any inability to obtain repair or replacement services for them could have serious operational consequences. Thus, it can be said that Australia is dependent on the United States in these regions. The existence of this type of dependency is recognized in the recent White Paper on Defence (see box below). The risk, of course, is that, for whatever reason and despite the development of agreements explaining how the ADF should obtain logistical support from the United States, the necessary parties or services are not available or inaccessible when necessary. The political and operational impact of this uncertainty will be discussed below. In order to obtain its common Australo-American military communications, the Reagan administration also had to assure the Hawke administration that these facilities would not be used in the strategic defence project, which the Australian Laboratory Party strongly rejected. Despite these differences of opinion, the Hawke Labor Government continued to support the ANSS security contract.
Nor did it support the ban on nuclear-powered vessels by its New Zealand counterpart. After THE ANS Split in February 1985, the Australian government also supported the Reagan administration`s plans to cancel trilateral military exercises and postpone the ANS Foreign Ministers` Conference. However, it maintained bilateral military relations and continued to share information with New Zealand.  Unlike New Zealand, Australia continued to allow U.S. warships to visit its ports and participate in joint military exercises with the United States.   In response to this strategic dilemma, Australia has established a model of relations with a great and powerful friend. It struggled to resist this dependence when it had the opportunity in the early 1950s to negotiate a treaty that would encourage the United States to supplement or replace Britain as allies, especially since the United States had been so capable and useful as an ally over Britain during World War II, when Australia was directly threatened. Australia was represented in the DEINS negotiations by Secretary of State Percy Spender, who took advantage of the U.S.
desire to reach a non-punishable agreement with Japan to get the Americans to agree, albeit reluctantly, to conclude a security agreement with Australia and New Zealand to ensure their security against a revitalized Japan. (10) With the fall of mainland China to communism and the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States was striving for a lenient agreement with Japan to use Japan as a bulwark against communism.